to use the Tasmanian case as an example, I favored the word "skill" throughout, and wrote with technological products in the foreground. "Skill," as I used it, included both knowledge and technique, and assumes learners observe both verbal and nonverbal behavior in their "cultural models" (i.e., the individuals they are learning from) in acquiring their final mental representations.2 In the case of technology, these skills often manifest themselves in the material record. However, I emphasize that nothing about the model confines it to the domain of technology: one could, with the right dataset, analyze the effects of demographics on cultural domains related to folkbiological knowledge.
Early in his paper (2006:165), Read indicates that by "skills" I meant "motor skills" -which I did not (see below). The word "motor" never appears in my paper. This misunderstanding is particularly odd since later in his own paper, in discussing his own model, he uses the word "skill" in the same way I did. Read writes, "with the exception of tasks requiring a high level of skill (both in terms of motor development and knowledge about effective task performance)..
." (2006:181).
Read also mischaracterizes Dual Inheritance Theory in general. Dual Inheritance theory's cultural evolutionary models apply to a wide range of cultural domains, including culturally transmitted skills, beliefs, knowledge, preferences, practices, techniques, and strategies. These models are general and can include the influence of verbal behaviors (e.g., words and sentences) and/or nonverbal behaviors on cultural transmission. As reviewed in Boyd and Richerson (1985: Chapter 3), a great deal of research on social learning suggests that learners use both the observation of nonverbal actions and their model's words to facilitate cultural learning (Bandura 1977) . Since both verbal and nonverbal behaviors go into the transmission process, it would be a mistake to exclude either. Furthermore, since the transmission process integrates both verbal and nonverbal behavior, it is not clear that partitioning these into separate channels (as Read suggests, without reference to empirical psychology) is necessary or sensible. A learner's knowledge is not merely a recording of what people tell him. Learners are selective in who they listen to, and acquired knowledge is substantially edited based on the nonverbal behavior of speakers. For example, if an expert tells a learner that a particular type of wood is best for making arrows, but the expert himself uses a different type of wood, learners will likely defer to the nonverbal action as a source of knowledge. This effect has been demonstrated in laboratory studies of social learning (reviewed in Henrich and Henrich 2007:Chapter 2). Note also that Read's intuitions about knowledge transmission as straightforward "communication" does not fit with what is known empirically about cultural learning in small-scale societies (Fiske 1998; Lancy 1996) .
To confront these confusions, I highlight material from both my paper and the main theoretical and empirical source cited in my paper. Let's begin with two quotations from my paper. First, from the section in my paper that describes the construction of the formal model, and specifically the evolving cultural variable, zp I wrote: Given these quotations, and many others in my paper, it is hard to see how Read concludes that the model, or my approach more generally, is limited to "motor skills," and does not include "knowledge" or "preferences."
Since the theoretical and empirical point of departure for my paper was Henrich and Gil-White (2001), it makes sense to examine this paper. The first line of the abstract refers to "information acquired via cultural transmission." Later, we wrote: our explanation focuses on particular forms of direct social learning, which we collectively term infocopying. This category encompasses all forms of acquiring information directly from another, and includes, but is not limited to, "true imitation" (acquiring the details of motor patterns via direct observation; see Tomasello 1999) and "goal emulation" (inferring behavioral goals via direct observation). Infocopying excludes indirect social learning processes, such as "social facilitation" or "local enhancement," where learners have a higher probability of reinventing something due to close proximity to a competent performer and the materials involved. showed. Releasing this assumption both makes the model more realistic and makes the process more likely to occur. This is why I wrote, in reference to the assumption in question, "In studying the conditions for maladaptive deteriorations in skill, this is a highly conservative assumption that favors cumulative cultural adaptation" (Henrich 2004:214). The proper approach to addressing a concern about this assumption would have been to modify the model by releasing the assumption in some more realistic manner, and then demonstrating that one gets a qualitatively different result. Read did not do this.
Those unfamiliar with formal evolutionary modeling might not understand the principle of optimal simplicity. The idea is that a proper formal evolutionary model aims to capture the governing dynamics of a process, while at the same time stripping the process to the bone. Unrealistic assumptions are rampant in every important model. Analogous to Read's criticism of my efforts, models from evolutionary biology typically assume random mating within large (infinite!) populations. That is, they assume every animal is equally likely to mate with every other animal (e.g., wolves in North America). Read presumably would criticize all of these models for a lack of realism, despite the fact that in many applications this assumption is harmless.4
With respect to the Tasmanian case in particular, however, the applicability of my model does Second, to assemble his dataset Read had to match the demographic data from Binford and Torrence with the tool data from Oswalt using group labels. This risks matching-up data taken at very different places and times. As a spot check on this, I went to the ethnographic sources that Oswalt used for the Andamese to obtain his measure of foodgetting toolkit complexity, pulled the population and densities information from this same source, and compared this to the population and density information found in Read. Radcliffe Tasmania the most complex instrument has 1 technounit (tu), the most complex weapon has 1 tu, the most complex untended facility has 4 tu, and the most complex tended facility has 1 tu. This gives Tasmania a MXT score of 7. Or, among the Yahgan, the most complex instrument has 6 tu, the most complex weapon has 6 tu, the most complex untended facility has 6 tu, and the most complex tended facility has 5 tu, giving MXT = 23.
Finally, before making use of this new dependent measure, I must highlight the fact that Read changed or selectively ignored the data he took from Binford. Since the Tasmanians are the group in question, the most problematic change was to raise the effective temperature (ET) from Binford's value 12.62 to Read's 19. 12. As a climatic measure, ET integrates the annual distribution of solar radiation with its intensity. Mysteriously, Read decided that the Tasmanian ET value from Binford, and only the Tasmanian value, did not capture what ET is supposed to measure. To "fix" this, Read regressed ET on another of Binford's climatic variables, TEMP, to get a linear relationship. He then used this regression to recalculate the Tasmania ET value. There are two major problems with this. First, if one thinks TEMP is a better measure, then TEMP should be used instead of ET in the toolkit complexity regression (or one could create and justify a new climatic variable; Binford provides several climate variables); but one should not arbitrarily change one unpleasant data point, especially when it is the key data point at issue. Any adjustments, besides requiring a real justification, should be uniformly applied to all the data points. In fact, if we apply the "correction" that Read applied only to the Tasmanian ET value (found in footnote 2 of Read's Table 1) Before analyzing MXT, a more appropriate measure of technological complexity vis-a-vis my model, the reader should note that nowhere did I claim that environment and ecology were not relevant to technology or technological change. To the contrary, the heart of cultural learning mechanisms like prestige-biased transmission is their ability to adapt to novel and uncertain environments by tapping the accumulated knowledge/skills, individual experiences, and innovations of others. Thus, our analysis begins by first explaining as much of the variability in MXT as we can using environment and ecology. To accomplish this, I use Collard et al.'s data plus the Yahgan. I prefer Collard's data to Read's, as the former has been synthesized and cross-checked across a variety of sources, including but not limited to Binford and Oswalt, and takes a multivariate approach. Collard et al. also did not apply Read's "corrections." I added the Yahgan using data from Binford and Oswalt because they were specifically referred to by Read.
With these data, I regressed MXT on (1) effective temperature (ET), (2) above ground productivity, (3) number of residential moves per year, (4) distance traveled annually during residential moves, (5) percentage contribution of terrestrial animals to the diet, and (6) the percentage contribution of aquatic animals to the diet.9 Following Collard et al., I used a step-wise backward regression, but any approach will yield the same result (e.g., step-wise forward): the only variable that explains any significant proportion of the variation in MXT is ET. As a lone predictor, ET captures 50 percent of the variation in MXT, with a standardized beta coefficient of -0.71 (p < .001).
Having removed as much of the influence of environment as we can, we can ask how each group's predicted MXT values compare to their actual MXT values. This residual difference is plotted for each group in Figure 1 . The first thing to notice is that Tasmania remains dramatically below where ET would predict. In fact, Tasmania is the only data point that standard regression rules-ofthumb flag as an outlier. Tasmania's MXT value is 7, the ET regression predicts that Tasmanians ought to have an MXT value of 27.4 -a factor of four difference.
While Tasmanians have, by far, the least complex food-getting tools, especially once their environment has been controlled for, a closer look at the other deviant groups is informative. On the low side, the Yahgan, who are predicted to have an MXT of 35 but show an actual value of 23, are the "canoe people" who inhabit the islands making up the archipelago of Tierra del Fuego. The rugged geography is such that they are only tenuously connected to the social networks of South America, and technological know-how would have to transmit through the land-dwelling Ona. Thus, their lowerthan-expected MXT value could plausibly be a consequence of demographic factors.
The In my paper, I explained that the real challenge for those who strictly adhere to ecological and economic models is to explain why the Tasmanians were so different -in terms of technological complexity -from their aboriginal cousins 150 miles across the Bass strait in Victoria. Read reaffirms my challenge when he writes:
As can be seen in Suppose not a single person currently performs Skill II on the island. Given this, how does our learner know the costs of learning to make and throw a boomerang? Even if there were a few boomerang-throwers on the island, all our learner might see would be lots of dead wallabies, but not the costs of learning the skill. To make the calculations required by Read's approach, every learner would have to begin the process of learning Skill II, and then pull out if need be, during the learning process. Otherwise, there is no way a learner could know that it is too costly to learn to make and use a boomerang. Neither the ethnographic nor the archaeological records reveals evidence that most people gather cost/benefit information about technology and craft production via this individual experimentation process (Fiske 1998; Lancy 1996) . There are not, for example, lots of unfinished or poorly made bone tools in the later archeological record of Tasmania (Jones 1977a). There is simply no way that learners could know that bone tools were too costly to waste time investing in (supposing that they were). Now Read might reply that he did not mean to suggest that each learner individually experimented with each possible technology and skill to assess its costs and benefits. However, if he does think that much of this information is transmitted (in some fashion) among individuals, then he is forced back into the world of cultural evolutionary (learning) models. In fact, most economic models will transform into learning, and usually into cultural learning, models once the acquisition of information (about costs and benefits, or anything else) is not considered totally free.
Cultural evolutionary models, building on substantial empirical evidence, propose that learners often use cues that indirectly or implicitly contain information about costs and benefits. These models provide psychologically plausible means by which individuals can adapt dynamically to the costs and benefits of technologies, physical environments, and their social worlds. For example, if an individual learns both how to invest his time, and some of the knowledge and techniques associated with that investment, from individuals who are highly successful, then he will be able to avoid investing in pursuits that are too costly (those investing in "too costly" pursuits won't achieve great success). In the case of our Tasmanian learner, if Skill II is in fact too costly and leads to too little investment in other areas (e.g., tracking or social relationships), then those who invest in Skill II will not be imitated, and Skill II will not spread. Now, however, our individuals need not engage in trial and error learning to figure out that they should not invest in Skill II. Most individuals will never even consider learning Skill II, or need to. Approaching the problem of learning about costs and benefits in this indirect fashion means that the effects described in my model can apply, as well as other evolutionary forces like drift (Shennan 2001).
The final problem with Read's model, and similar static economic approaches, is that there's no evolution. The model has no endogenous dynamics. If costs and benefits change, does the entire population shift instantaneously to the new optimal technology? If cost and benefits, or climatic variables for that matter, do not change, is culture (including technology) static? To see this more sharply, consider that my model connects demographics to rates of cumulative cultural evolution. I highlighted the possibility that a drop in the size of the pool of interacting social learners could initiate a process of cultural loss that could include adaptive knowledge, practices, skill, etc. But, on the flip side, the model also predicts different rates of adaptive cumulative cultural evolution, depending on the size and interconnectedness of a population. It can also address why technology becomes increasingly adaptive and complex over broad time spans, without any direct connection to climate (McBrearty and Brooks 2000). It is unclear how Read's model addresses cumulative cultural evolution, possibly the hallmark of our species (Boyd and Richerson 1996) . in Kelly (1995), matching by ethnolinguistic label. To assess the noise in the data, I calculated the standard deviation in estimated densities for each group, and then calculated the average standard deviation between these data sources. These measures are 18.5 (Kelly), 12.2 (Read), and 10.4 (Read vs. Kelly). The last measure is concerning, since it means that the average standard deviation between Read's and Kelly's estimates is almost as large as the standard deviation in the data themselves: there is an awful lot of noise here -by "noise" I include any temporal and spatial variation that is unaccounted for by the matching ethnolinguistic labels. If one removes the Andamese (a clear outlier in Kelly's data), these standard deviations drop to 8.37, 11.52, and 6.9, respectively. The good news is that the density datasets do correlate .58. 9. For statistical reasons, I used the natural logarithm of all of these predictor variables in the regression except number of residential moves per year and percentage contribution of aquatic animals to diet.
